ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
here has been considerable research on the CEO turnover and succession process. However, there has been relatively little research on how boards actually select successors, despite the belief held by many that selecting the CEO is the most important decision that a board of directors makes (Larcker et al., 2014) . Most prior research has focused on the choice of outside vs. inside successions (Finkelstein et al., 2009) . Parrino (1997) and Custodio et al. (2013) find that boards tend to select outside successors from homogeneous industries where the successor CEOs may have transferable skills. Farrell and Whidbee (2003) and Favaro et al. (2010) find that boards are more likely to choose an outside CEO when the firm is expected to have poor performance and uncertainty is high. Allgood and Farrell (2003) show that boards are more likely to choose an outside CEO when the predecessor has been terminated after a short tenure. Naveen (2006) finds that large multidivision firms with greater organizational complexity tend to choose an inside CEO since in this case firm-specific knowledge is essential and difficult to transfer from any other industry. Taken as a whole, this research suggests that where the hired CEO is from (i.e., industry or inside/outside the firm) matters, so it is reasonable to expect that CEO experience matters (Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998) . Thus, CEO background is important to boards when they make succession decisions, but research has not definitively quantified how boards select successors and how they determine if a successor will fit the company's needs.
One of the contributions of our study is that, unlike prior research which has examined CEO characteristics and firm outcomes after the hiring of a new CEO (Koyuncu et al., 2010) , we are looking at firm characteristics as being motivators for the CEO hires. That is to say, we take the firm characteristics as the determinants rather than the We address two research questions. Do boards consider CEO educational and functional background when choosing a new CEO? What factors determine whether the board of directors will seek an incoming CEO with a different educational and/or functional background from that of the current CEO? 1 In this study we find that the outgoing CEO and the firm characteristics do influence the choice of the successor's functional background and that there is a matching of CEO degrees to firm characteristics. Research and development oriented firms are more likely to hire CEOs with the functional background that would permit them to understand the firm's research process. Riskier firms are less likely to hire CEOs with a degree from an Ivy League institution. Smaller firms are more likely to hire CEOs with lower levels of education. We also find that firms are more likely to change the functional background of the successor relative to the predecessor when there has been poor prior performance and the firm has higher institutional investor ownership.
BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES

CEO Educational Background
There is significant literature on CEO educational background and its effects on the firm. There are two branches of research 2 when it comes to the topic of how CEO education influences the firm. The first branch of research examines the relation between the type of education of the CEO and the behavior of the firm. For example, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) , Tyler and Steensma (1998) , and Barker and Mueller (2002) all find that the type of degree that the CEO holds has an impact on the firm's research and development funding. Harvey (2001, 2002) and Graham et al. (2005) , find that CEOs and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) holding MBAs were more likely than other executives to use techniques such as net present value for capital budgeting and the capital asset pricing model in cost of capital calculations. CEOs with MBAs tend to be more aggressive, on average, choosing to engage in a higher level of capital expenditures, holding more debt, and paying smaller dividends (Bertrand and Scholar, 2003) .
In addition, several studies have shown a relation between education level and rate of corporate innovation, or the likelihood of strategic change (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) . Advanced management education, in particular, may solidify common beliefs and taken-for-granted assumptions about normative or proper strategic decision making (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) . Hambrick and Mason (1984) also suggest that advanced education both encourages and indicates a preference for administrative complexity.
The second branch of research investigates the relation between the selectively of the CEO's education and firm performance. Deary (2004) and Frey and Ditterman (2004) both report that entrance exam scores are strongly correlated with intelligence tests, and hence it may be that CEOs from highly selective schools are better run firms due to the fact that they can process more information (Elsaid, 2014) . Moreover, Burt (1992) and Belliveau et al. (1996) find that CEOs from more selective schools enjoy stronger ties to government officials which can improve the performance of the firm. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) finds some evidence that firms with CEOs that lack an Ivy League undergraduate degree may have worse performance. Bertrand and Scholar (2003) find that CEOs who hold MBA degrees are associated with higher operating return on assets. On the other hand, Gottesman and Morey (2010) find no evidence that the type or selectively of education of the CEO is related to firm financial performance. Bhagat et al. (2010) show that the decision to replace a CEO has nothing to do with the CEO's education and everything to do with his/her performance. Despite of this result, education is an important factor in the hiring of the incoming CEO. The Bhagat et al. (2010) results lead to the puzzling implication that, while CEO education appears to play an important role in the hiring of CEOs, it does not affect the long-term firm performance.
CEO Functional Background
Career experiences or functional background may be an important characteristic when boards search for a new CEO (Beal and Yasai-Ardekani, 2000; Carpenter et al., 2001) , and functional background has attracted the attention of researchers (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Smith and White, 1987; Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Ocasio and Kim, 1999; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001; Bunderson and Sutcliffe, 2002; Bunderson, 2003; Herrmann and Datta, 2005; Koyuncu et al., 2010) . Functional background is important because the work experiences top managers bring to their jobs has a direct influence on how they define problems (Dearborn and Simon, 1958) , how they make strategic choices (Hitt and Ireland, 1985; Smith and White, 1987; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001) , and how they process information (Walsh, 1988) . In turn, these factors will likely affect both organizational performance (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984) and the career outcomes of managers (Sheridan et al., 1990) . The CEO's functional background is one of the ways the firm communicates the priorities that it is setting. It reflects the firm's culture, values and potential strategic direction (Smith and White, 1987; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001; Koyuncu et al., 2010) .
Historically, the preferences for CEO functional backgrounds have shifted with the changes in business environment. For example, during the period between 1925 and 1950 CEOs often had a manufacturing and operations background (Newcomer, 1955) . This trend shifted in the 1960s and 1970s when the majority of executives who climbed the corporate ladder to the CEO position in large U.S. organizations had a finance background (Fligstein, 1987) . In the 1980s and the early 1990s there was a reversal in trends and the majority of CEOs had a functional background in operations (Ocasio and Kim, 1999) . The prevalence of CEOs with a functional background in operations continued between 1992 and 2005 (Koyuncu et al., 2010) . Pfeffer (1981) and Useem and Karabel (1986) suggest that functional background provides a salient basis for executive selection. Chaganti and Sambharya (1987) , Murray (1989) , Michel and Hambrick (1992) and Westphal and Zajac (1995) determine the new CEOs' functional backgrounds by examining the prior job titles and employment history. They define three categories of functional backgrounds. Output functional backgrounds include positions in marketing and sales. Throughput functional backgrounds include positions in operations, R&D and engineering. Peripheral functional backgrounds include positions in law, finance and accounting. Dearborn and Simon (1958) show that executives selectively perceive and identify company problems depending on their functional area, suggesting that executives with primary experience in a particular functional area tend to have similar viewpoints on the sources of poor performance. Waller et al. (1995) find that top executives were more aware of changes in organizational effectiveness related to their own functional backgrounds; for instance, executives with a functional background in operations were more sensitive to changes in operational efficiency for the organization. Thus, functional background may influence executives' perceptions and beliefs about the most
Testable Hypotheses
Our testable hypotheses build on the conceptual framework and empirical results of the managerial pedigree literature. Our first hypothesis focuses on CEO selection in the context of matching CEO background to firm characteristics. The match between the CEO and the firm is an important consideration. Firms should choose CEOs with traits that match firm needs since the CEOs' skill set and experience influences firm policies, performance, and value. We propose that the board of directors will seek to hire a new CEO with a background that best fits with the structural or cultural characteristics of the firm. The firm characteristics may be observable, allowing for clear predictions of the requisite background needed to manage the organization. For example, companies with high levels of R&D expenditures may be more likely to hire a CEO with a throughput background (Datta and Guthrie, 1994) . On the other hand, important characteristics of the firm, such as organizational culture, may be unobservable. When the former CEO has been successful or when firm-specific knowledge is essential, firms are more likely to hire a successor CEO that possesses similar pedigree as the predecessor (Smith and White, 1987; Vancil, 1987) . As such, the best indicator of organizational fit may be the pedigree of the former CEO. Specifically, we propose that the new CEO is more likely to have a functional or educational background similar to the former CEO, on average. So our first hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1a:
The new CEO is likely to have a functional background that is similar to the predecessor's background.
Hypothesis 1b:
The new CEO is likely to have an educational background that is similar to the predecessor's background.
Our second hypothesis examines instances where the board of directors may be more likely to seek a change in CEO pedigree by hiring a new CEO with a different functional or educational background than the outgoing CEO. Here, the board of directors will seek to hire a new CEO with a different functional or educational background than the outgoing CEO when there is greater pressure from shareholders, either actual or perceived, to make a change. For example, while firms may seek to hire new CEOs with similar backgrounds to the outgoing CEO (i.e., those most likely to have greater fit with the firm), the board of directors may want to make a change when past performance is poor or when the CEO succession is forced. In such cases, the hiring of a new CEO with a different functional or educational background than the outgoing CEO may signal to the market that the board of directors is seeking to make a change in strategy and/or culture.
Hypothesis 2:
The likelihood of a change in CEO functional and/or educational background relative to the incumbent CEO is greater when the board of directors faces greater pressure to make a change.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA
Sample Selection
We identify CEO successions using the Execucomp database. Execucomp includes annual compensation data from proxy statements for the five highest paid executives of firms in the S&P 1500 and contains 3,080 different firms from 1992 to 2009. Following Cremers and Grinstein (2009) , we identify the executive who is the CEO using the variable CEOANN. This results in a sample of 27,278 firm years where an executive is identified as the CEO. Execucomp also provides the year in which the CEO was appointed as the CEO (BECAMECEO). This results in a sample of 25,776 firm years with data necessary to determine the year in which the succession occurred and 1,877 firm years in which the current CEO is classified as new. The Clute Institute
We then randomly 4 select 940 firm years (~50%) and use firm proxy statements and the Marquis Who's Who database to collect data for each CEO's prior job titles and employment history. Overall, we obtain CEO functional and educational background information for 832 CEO successions for 476 Execucomp firms from 1992 to 2009. We lose 4 observations because we are unable to determine the age or tenure of the outgoing CEO. We lose 2 observations because we are unable to determine whether the new CEO joined the company from the outside or whether the succession was voluntary or forced. This reduces our sample to 826 CEO successions from 1992 to 2009.
We then match this data with Compustat for accounting data. This results in a matched sample of 778 CEO successions from 1992 to 2009. We also match with the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) for stock price data. This results in a matched sample of 682 CEO successions from 1992 to 2009. We also match with the Thomson 13F (13F) database for institutional ownership data. This results in a matched sample of 680 CEO successions from 1992 to 2009. Finally, we match with the RiskMetrics (1995 to 2007) and Equilar (2008 and 2009) 5 databases for board of director characteristics (i.e., board size and the percentage of independent directors).
Due to data limitations in RiskMetrics, board characteristics are only available from fiscal year 1995 onward, which further reduces our sample size when using board of director variables to 420.
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Variable Descriptions
Our primary dependent variables are the functional and educational background of the new CEO and whether the new CEO has a different functional or educational background than the outgoing CEO. Our primary independent variables are functional and educational background of the outgoing CEO. We also include several additional control variables to proxy for firm specific factors. Table 1 describes the construction of the variables and data sources in more detail. 
CEO Functional Background
We follow prior research by Chaganti and Sambharya (1987) , Murray (1989) , Michel and Hambrick (1992) and Westphal and Zajac (1995) in determining the CEOs' functional backgrounds by examining the prior job titles and employment history. Output functional backgrounds (OUTPUT) include positions in marketing and sales. The Clute Institute
Throughput functional backgrounds (THRPUT) include positions in operations, R&D and engineering. Peripheral functional backgrounds (PERIPH) include positions in law, finance, and accounting. We use firm proxy statements and the Marquis Who's Who database to collect data for CEOs' prior job titles and employment history. A caveat of the classifications of CEO functional backgrounds in our study is that the vast majority of CEOs (more than 95%) have had experience in two or more areas as they were rising in the ranks of a company or companies. In these cases, we use the functional area where the CEO spent the most time to determine the CEO's functional background.
CEO Educational Background
We follow prior research by Westphal and Zajac (1995) , Zajac and Westphal (1996) and Elsaid (2014) in determining the CEOs' educational backgrounds. Similar to Elsaid (2014) .
"we divide the CEOs' educational backgrounds into four categories: those with no undergraduate degree (NODEGR), those where the highest degree obtained is an undergraduate degree (UNDER), those where the highest degree obtained is a Masters degree (or its equivalent) (MASTER) and those where the highest degree obtained is a PhD degree (PHD)."
We combine the categories no degree and undergraduate degree into the category non-graduate degree and the categories masters degree and Ph.D. into the category graduate degree (GRADUATE) due to low cell count in the no degree and Ph.D. categories. 7 We include Ivy League affiliation (IVY) as part of the CEOs' educational background. We use firm proxy statements, the Marquis Who's Who database and Bloomberg to collect data for each CEOs' prior education.
Controls
We control for the outgoing CEO age and tenure. We use firm proxy statements and Execucomp to collect data on CEO characteristics. The CEO age and tenure could be an indication on how well the CEO manages the firm. Alderfer (1986) suggests that upper level managers with limited experience will likely be less effective in running their companies. Older, more experienced CEOs with longer tenures are more likely to have a better understanding of the firm, its industry, and management practices, in general. This could translate into better firm performance.
We use firm proxy statements and Execucomp to determine the number of CEO successions for each firm over our sample period. Similar to Elsaid (2014 First, we measure board size as the number of directors serving on the board during the year. Next, we classify directors as insiders (those who are current employees of the firm) and outsiders (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Elsaid et al., 2009) . We then create a variable for the percent of outside board directors which is calculated as the ratio of outside directors scaled by total directors on the board. Regulators and academics believe that outside (independent) directors are generally more effective monitors than inside (non-independent) directors. For example, the SarbanesOxley Act and the exchange rules in 2002 require that the majority of the board be independent, while numerous studies link the proportion of outside directors to financial performance and shareholder wealth (e.g., Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Brickley et al., 1994; Cotter et al., 1997) . We also determine whether the CEO holds the title of CEO and COB (Chairman of the Board) and create a dummy variable equal to one in such cases, and zero otherwise. CEO duality may concentrate power in the CEO's position and allow the CEO to control information available to other directors impeding effective monitoring (Jensen, 1993) .
Further, we control for institutional investor ownership percentage. We expect that institutional ownership percentage may proxy for the level of external pressure faced by a firm to change CEO functional or educational background when past performance is poor. We calculate institutional ownership percentage (INSTOWN) as the percentage of common shares outstanding held by institutions during the year.
Lastly, we control for several firm specific factors. We expect that CEO succession and successor choice is highly correlated with firm performance. Therefore, we control for stock performance (RET12) and accounting performance (ROA). We proxy for growth opportunities and information asymmetry using Tobin's Q (Q), the level of R&D expenditures (R&D/SALES), the level of advertising expenditures (ADV/SALES), and stock return volatility (SDRET36). Jensen (1993) argues that the monitoring of high growth firms is costly, while Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that firms with higher stock return volatility have higher levels of information asymmetry. We also control for firm size (LNSALES) and total debt to total assets (TD/TA). We lag the measurement of firm specific control variables by one year (t= −1) relative to the CEO succession year (t = 0). 
Descriptive Statistics
RESULTS
Determinants of New CEO Pedigree
We begin our analysis by examining the determinants of new CEO functional or educational background. We expect that the board of directors will seek to hire a new CEO with a background that best fits with the structural or cultural characteristics of the firm. Therefore, we examine whether characteristics of the outgoing CEO or firm affect the probability of the new CEO having a specific functional or educational background.
We use a multinomial logit model which simultaneously estimates binary logit models for all comparisons (i.e., CEO pedigree classifications). The multinomial logit model can be written as: 
for m = 1 to J, where m indexes categories, b is the base category, and ′ ( are case specific regressors (a constant, RET12 t-1 , ROA t-1 ,TD/TA t-1 , LNSALES t-1 , Q t-1 , R&D/SALES t-1 , ADV/SALES t-1 , SDRET36 t-1 , OAGE, OTENURE, NUMSUCC) . As ln % % = ln 1 = 0, it must hold that % % = 0. Therefore, the log odds of an outcome variable with itself is always 0, as is the effect of any independent variables. The J equations can be solved to compute the predicted probabilities:
This model ensures that 0 < Pr = , ( < 1, and Pr = , ( H I/A = 1. We could have estimated each of the categories using a series of individual binary logit models, but the disadvantage of this procedure is that each binary logit comparing the predicted probabilities of one group to another would be based on a different sample (Long and Freese, 2006) . For example, a binary logit model comparing the predicted probabilities of OUTPUT to THRPUT would have a different number of observations than one comparing OUTPUT to PERIPH or THRPUT to PERIPH. The remaining observations pertaining to the non-comparison groups in each binary logit would be excluded from analysis. The multinomial logit model allows us to overcome this limitation. Here and throughout we cluster standard errors at the industry level. The Clute Institute Table 3 reports results using CEO functional background as the dependent variable. We report average marginal effects (or discrete changes for binary variables), which describe how each of our independent variables affect the probability of the new CEO being in the functional categories of output, throughput, or peripheral. 9 Here and throughout we cluster standard errors at the industry level. Columns 1 -4 contain estimated results including dummy variables for the outgoing CEO's functional background and firm specific control variables. Our results support H1a, which predicts that the new CEO is likely to have a functional background that is similar to the predecessor's background. The estimated coefficient on FNDMAJ is positive and significant in column 1, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO is a founder, co-founder, founding family member, majority shareholder, or member of majority shareholding family. Firms are more likely to hire a new CEO that is a founder or majority shareholder when the outgoing CEO is also a founder or majority shareholder. The probability that the new CEO is a founder or majority shareholder is 0.05 greater if the outgoing CEO is a founder or majority shareholder, averaged over the estimation sample. The estimated coefficient on OUTPUT is positive and significant in column 2, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO has an output functional background. Firms are more likely to hire a new CEO with an output functional background when the outgoing CEO also has an output functional background. The probability that the new CEO has an output functional background is 0.08 greater if the outgoing CEO also has an output functional background, averaged over the estimation sample. Similarly, the estimated coefficient on PERIPH is positive and significant in column 4, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO has a peripheral functional background. The probability that the new CEO has a peripheral functional background is 0.09 greater if the outgoing CEO also has a peripheral functional background, averaged over the estimation sample. Lastly, a likelihood ratio test of the joint significance of the outgoing CEO functional background dummies in the multinomial model is significant (χ2 = 28.991). This provides additional support that outgoing CEO functional background is a predictor of new CEO functional background. Our results suggest that the pedigree of the former CEO is a predictor of the organizational fit of the new CEO. Firms are more likely to hire new CEOs with functional backgrounds similar to the outgoing CEO.
Determinants of New CEO Background
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Our results also provide support for a matching of new CEO background to observable firm characteristics.
The estimated coefficient on RD/SALES is negative and significant in column 2, but positive and significant in column 3, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO has a throughput functional background. Firms with higher levels of R&D expenditures are less likely to hire a new CEO with an output background, but more likely to hire a new CEO with the operations, R&D, or engineering background necessary to manage the firm. A one unit change in R&D expenditures is associated with a 0.01 lower probability of the new CEO having an output background and a 0.01 higher probability of the new CEO having a throughput background, averaged over the estimation sample. Conversely, the estimated coefficient on ADV/SALES is negative and significant in column 3, but positive and significant in columns 2 and 4. Firms with higher levels of Advertising expenditures are less likely to hire a new CEO with a throughput functional background, but more likely to hire a new CEO with an output or peripheral functional background. A one unit change in Advertising expenditures is associated with a 0.02 lower probability of the new CEO having a throughput background, a 0.01 higher probability of the new CEO having an output background, and a 0.01 higher probability of the new CEO having a peripheral background, averaged over the estimation sample.
The estimated coefficient on ROA is positive and significant in column 3, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO has a throughput functional background. More profitable firms (firms with higher ROA) are more likely to hire a new CEO with a throughput background. A one unit increase in ROA is associated with a 0.005 higher probability of the CEO having a throughput background, averaged over the estimation sample. However, the estimated coefficient on ROA is negative and significant in column 4, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO has a peripheral functional background. Firms with lower levels of profitability (ROA) are more likely to hire a new CEO with finance or accounting backgrounds. This may suggest the willingness of the firm to bring in a new CEO with the necessary financial background to improve accounting performance. A one unit increase in ROA is associated with a 0.007 lower probability of the CEO having a peripheral background, averaged over the estimation sample.
We next examine whether the nature of the succession, voluntary versus forced and inside versus outside succession, are predictors of the functional background of the new CEO. The estimated coefficient on FORCED is positive and significant in column 1, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO is a founder or majority shareholder. Forced successions are more likely to involve a new CEO that is a founder or majority shareholder. Conversely, the estimated coefficient on FORCED is negative and significant in column 3, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO has a throughput functional background. Forced successions are less likely to involve a new CEO with a throughput background. A discrete change from voluntary to forced succession is associated with a 0.17 lower probability of the CEO having a throughput background, averaged over the estimation sample.
Further, the estimated coefficient on OUTSIDE is positive and significant in column 3, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO has a throughput functional background. New CEOs with a throughput background are more likely to come from outside the firm. However, the estimated coefficient on OUTSIDE is negative and significant in columns 1 and 4, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO is a founder or majority shareholder or has a peripheral functional background, respectively. Outside successions are less likely to involve a new CEO who is a founder or majority shareholder or has a peripheral background. A discrete change from inside to outside succession is associated with a 0.06 (0.08) lower probability of the CEO being a founder or majority shareholder (having a peripheral background), averaged over the estimation sample.
Lastly, we examine whether outgoing CEO characteristics, such as age or tenure, or the number of successions within the firm over our sample period (NUMSUC) are predictors of the functional background of the new CEO. The estimated coefficient on OTENURE is negative and significant in column 3, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO has a throughput functional background. Firms are less likely to hire a new CEO with a throughput background when the outgoing CEO has longer tenure. A one unit increase in outgoing CEO tenure is associated with a 0.006 lower probability of the CEO having a throughput background, averaged over the estimation sample. Conversely, the estimated coefficient on OTENURE is positive and significant in column 4, which estimates the predicted probability that the new CEO has a peripheral functional background. Firms are more likely to hire new CEO with a peripheral background when the outgoing CEO has longer tenure. A one unit increase in outgoing CEO tenure is associated with a 0.005 higher probability of the CEO having a peripheral background, averaged over the estimation sample. Table 4 reports results for a binary logit model using CEO degree as the dependent variable. Column 1 contains estimated results of a binary logit regression using an indicator for whether the new CEO has a graduate degree as the dependent variable (GRADUATE) and the independent variables are as in model (1). Column 2 contains estimated results of a binary logit regression using an indicator for whether the new CEO has an Ivy League degree as the dependent variable (IVY) and the independent variables are as in model (1). We report average marginal effects (or discrete changes for binary variables), which describe how each of our independent variables affect the probability of the new CEO having a graduate degree or an Ivy League degree. Column 1 contains estimated results for change in CEO functional background. The estimated coefficients on the dummy variables for FNDMAJ, OUTPUT, and PERIPHERAL are significant. Firms with outgoing CEOs with these three functional backgrounds are more likely to make a change in functional background. This result is consistent with a majority of CEOs in our sample having a throughput functional background (the reference group). None of the estimated coefficients on board of director characteristics, board size (BDSIZE) and the percentage of independent directors (PIND) are significant with the exception of a negative and marginally significant estimated coefficient on DUALITY. Similarly, the estimated coefficient on the percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders (INSTOWN) is not significant. Examining the performance measures, the estimated coefficients on RET12 and ROA are negative and significant. Worse performing firms have higher probabilities of changing CEO functional backgrounds. For the average firm, a 1 unit increase in prior 12-month cumulative annualized stock return decreases the probability of a change in CEO functional background by 0.15, while a 1 unit increase in prior ROA decreases the probability of a change in CEO functional background by 0.006, holding all other variables at their mean.
Determinants of New CEO Degree
As the previous results suggest, a change in CEO functional background may be conditional on firm performance. As such, the board of directors or institutional owners may exert greater influence when the firm exhibits poor prior performance. Therefore, column 2 contains estimated results for change in CEO functional background conditional on the firm having a negative prior 12-month cumulative annualized return (RET12 < 0). Again, none of the estimated coefficients on board of director characteristics (BDSIZE and PIND) are significant. However, the estimated coefficient on DUALITY is now negative and significant at the 0.01 level. For the average firm, a discrete change from a separate CEO and Chairman of the board (COB) to the CEO also holding the title of COB decreases probability of a change in CEO functional background by 0.20. Further, the estimated coefficient on INSTOWN is now positive and significant at the 0.01 level. Firms with higher levels of INSTOWN and poor prior stock performance have a higher probability of changing CEO functional background. For the average firm, a 1 unit increase in institutional ownership percentage increases the probability of a change in CEO functional background by 0.006, holding all other variables at their mean.
Column 3 contains estimated results where change in CEO degree is the dependent variable. The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the outgoing CEO has a graduate degree (GRADUATE) is negative and significant. This suggests that when the outgoing CEO has a graduate degree firms are less likely to hire a less educated CEO (i.e., one with only an undergraduate degree). None of the estimated coefficients on board of director characteristics (BDSIZE, PIND, or DUALITY) or institutional ownership (INSTOWN) are significant. In contrast to the results of change in functional background, the estimated coefficients on RET12 and ROA are also not significant. Prior performance is not a significant predictor of change in CEO degree. Further, Column 4 contains estimated results for change in CEO degree conditional on the firm having a negative prior 12-month cumulative annualized return. None of the estimated coefficients on board of director characteristics (BDSIZE, PIND, or DUALITY) or institutional ownership (INSTOWN) are significant.
Finally, Column 5 contains estimated results where change in CEO Ivy League affiliation is the dependent variable. The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the outgoing CEO has a degree from an Ivy League institution (IVY) is positive and significant. This suggests that when the outgoing CEO has a degree from an Ivy League institution the firm is more likely to hire a new CEO without an Ivy League degree. None of the estimated coefficients on board of director characteristics (BDSIZE, PIND, or DUALITY) are significant. However, the estimated coefficient on institutional ownership (INSTOWN) is negative and significant. Firms with higher levels of institutional ownership are less likely to make a change in CEO Ivy League affiliation. Similar to the results for change in degree, the estimated coefficients on RET12 and ROA are not significant. Prior performance is not a significant predictor of change in CEO Ivy League affiliation. However, the estimated coefficient on FORCED is positive and significant. Firms are more likely to make a change in Ivy League affiliation when the CEO is forcibly removed from office. For the average firm, a discrete change from voluntary to forced succession increases the probability of a change in CEO Ivy League affiliation by 0.14. Lastly, Column 6 contains estimated results for change in CEO Ivy League affiliation conditional on the firm having a negative prior 12-month cumulative annualized return. None of the estimated coefficients on board of director characteristics, board size (BDSIZE) and percentage of independent directors (PIND) are significant with the exception of a positive and marginally significant estimated coefficient on DUALITY. The estimated coefficient on institutional ownership (INSTOWN) remains negative and marginally significant.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we address two research questions. The first question is whether firm or predecessor characteristics are associated with a board of director's choice of successor CEO functional background or education level. We find evidence that predecessor characteristics influence successor CEO functional background, but no convincing evidence that they influence the successor CEO education level. However, there are several firm characteristics that influence the choice of successor. First, we find a strong and consistent relation between a company's ratio of R&D to sales with the choice of a successor that has a "throughput" functional background.
That is, companies that engage in significant R&D tend to hire CEOs that have come from operations, research and development and engineering. The implications of these findings are that firms that are research driven tend to want CEOs that are familiar with and have the knowledge base to understand the company's research. Also, we find that firms with low prior profitability are more likely to hire a successor CEO with a finance/accounting background. This is contrary to prior research that shows a tendency for non-profitable firms to hire CEOs with throughput functional backgrounds (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Datta and Guthrie, 1994; Guthrie and Datta, 1997) .
Our second research question is what firm characteristics influence a company to hire a successor with a different functional background than that of the predecessor. We find that changes from successor to predecessor functional background occur more often in firms that are performing poorly and when the firm has higher institutional investor ownership. The implications of these findings are that boards that are unhappy with a predecessor CEO seek successors with different skill sets. This finding is consistent with the body of prior research that has found that firms needing a change hire outside successors. Needing a change also seems to lead firms to hire CEOs with different skill sets than that of the predecessor.
The paper makes a contribution to the management and corporate finance literature by considering firm characteristics as motivators for the CEO hires rather than the outcome of hiring decisions. Another contribution of the paper is examining whether firms match the incoming CEO background with the outgoing CEO background. The paper has implications for the board of directors. Our results should shed light on how boards can use firm characteristics and outgoing CEO characteristics to motivate the incoming CEO characteristics.
